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Android’s 3× 3 graphical pattern lock scheme is one of the widely used authentication method on smartphone devices. However, users
choose 3 × 3 patterns from a small subspace of all possible 389,112 patterns. The two recently proposed interfaces, SysPal by Cho et al.
[Cho et al. 2017] and TinPal by the authors [Tupsamudre et al. 2018], demonstrate that it is possible to influence users 3 × 3 pattern
choices by making small modifications in the existing interface. While SysPal forces users to include one, two or three system-assigned
random dots in their pattern, TinPal employs a highlighting mechanism to inform users about the set of reachable dots from the
current selected dot. Both interfaces improved the security of 3 × 3 patterns without affecting usability, but no comparison between
SysPal and TinPal was presented.
To address this gap, we conduct a new user study with 147 participants and collect patterns on three SysPal interfaces, 1-dot, 2-dot
and 3-dot. We also consider original and TinPal patterns collected in our previous user study involving 99 participants [Tupsamudre
et al. 2018]. We compare patterns created on five different interfaces, original, TinPal, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot using a range of security
and usability metrics including pattern length, stroke length, guessability, recall time and login attempts. Our study results show
that participants in the TinPal group created significantly longer and complex patterns than participants in the other four groups.
Consequently, the guessing resistance of TinPal patterns was the highest among all groups. Further, we did not find any significant
difference in memorability of patterns created in the TinPal group and the other groups.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Android’s pattern lock scheme in which users connect at least four dots in 3 × 3 grid is one of the most popular
authentication mechanisms to protect sensitive information on mobile devices. According to research studies [Mahfouz
et al. 2016; Van Bruggen 2014], nearly 40% of the Android users employ 3 × 3 patterns to secure their smartphones.
Other built-in authentication methods such as PINs and passwords are available, however pattern lock is perceived
to be more usable than PINs and passwords [Zezschwitz et al. 2013]. Moreover, psychological studies [Paivio et al.
1968; Shepard 1967; Yuille 1983] show that human brain is better at remembering and recalling graphical information
as compared to numbers and letters. Biometric alternatives are also usable, but they are available only in high-end
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Android devices and are considered to be less secure than 3 × 3 patterns [bio 2019]. Further, in order to use biometrics,
the user is also required to choose a PIN or pattern as a fallback method which is activated whenever biometrics fail.
Nowadays, Android phones (e.g., Xiaomi) come with built-in applock feature that enables users to protect their critical
personal applications such as banking app, Facebook app or gallery app using 3 × 3 patterns. Users can also choose
from various 3 × 3 pattern lock apps available in app store (e.g., AppLock by DoMobileLab has over 350 million users).
To enhance security further, some vendors (e.g., CyanLockScreen) allow users to select patterns on larger grid sizes
ranging from 4 × 4 up to 12 × 12.
Although 3 × 3 patterns are considered to be usable, they are prone to a wide range of attacks including guessing
attacks, shoulder-surfing attacks and smudge attacks. Many research studies [Aviv et al. 2015; Tupsamudre et al. 2017;
Uellenbeck et al. 2013] show that user-selected patterns are highly biased. The theoretical space of 3 × 3 patterns is
large (389,112), however users choose simple patterns resembling English letters such as ‘Z’, ‘S’, ‘M’, ‘N’, ‘L’, ‘R’ and
‘G’. The characteristics such as knight moves, overlaps, direction changes, intersections (crosses) which enhance the
visual complexity of patterns are almost never used [Andriotis et al. 2014; Aviv and Fichter 2014; Song et al. 2015; Sun
et al. 2014; Zezschwitz et al. 2015]. Consequently, the resulting patterns could be easily memorized by an observer. The
pattern lock scheme is also susceptible to smudge attack [Aviv et al. 2010], a type of side-channel attack in which the
attacker infers user’s pattern using physical traces left by fingers on the screen. Further related work [Andriotis et al.
2013] even suggests that it is possible to recover the entire pattern from the partial traces by exploiting users’ biased
choices. To counter these attacks, Android enforces a lock-out policy that allows a maximum of 20 consecutive failed
attempts [Cho et al. 2017]. Even with this policy, attackers could still recover a significant portion of user-selected
patterns (about 18.5%) [Tupsamudre et al. 2017]. Increasing the grid size to 4 × 4 does not help either, as users choose
4 × 4 patterns that are simple embeddings of 3 × 3 patterns [Aviv et al. 2015]. Users’ pattern choices remain biased even
in the presence of pattern strength meters [Song et al. 2015].
In our earlier work [Tupsamudre et al. 2018], we proposed TinPal, an enhanced 3 × 3 interface that employs
a highlighting mechanism to inform users about the set of reachable dots from the currently connected dot. The
highlighting works in real-time during pattern creation as well as during pattern recall. We evaluated the efficacy of
TinPal in a lab study with 99 participants. Participants were randomly split into two groups. The first group of 49
participants created patterns using the original interface and the second group of 50 participants created patterns using
TinPal. We compared patterns in two groups with respect to the pattern length, stroke length, knight moves, overlaps,
direction changes, intersections, and start point and end point distributions (Table 1). We found that participants
who used TinPal created significantly longer patterns containing visually complex features such as knight moves and
overlaps than those who used the original interface. Consequently, TinPal patterns offered more resistance against
guessing attacks. Further, we did not find any significant difference in memorability and efficiency of patterns between
the two groups.
To improve the security of 3 × 3 patterns, Cho et al. proposed System-guided pattern lock (SysPal) that mandates
users to include system-assigned random dot(s) at any position while creating their pattern [Cho et al. 2017]. Note that
unlike SysPal, TinPal does not mandate users to include any specific dot(s) in their pattern, it just informs users about
the next available dot choices by highlighting them in real-time while the pattern is being drawn. The authors [Cho
et al. 2017] evaluated three different SysPal policies, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot which required study participants to use
one, two or three system-assigned dots in their pattern respectively. They conducted an online study involving 1,717
participants to measure security and usability of all three SysPal policies. Later they conducted a lab study with 46
participants to measure memorability of patterns created using 1-dot and 2-dot SysPal policies. The results of their
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Characteristic TinPal [Tupsamudre et al. 2018] SysPal [Cho et al. 2017] Current Submission
pattern length
√ √ √
stroke length
√ × √
knight moves
√ × √
overlaps
√ × √
direction changes
√ × √
intersections
√ × √
segment frequencies × √ √
dot frequencies × √ √
start point distribution
√ √ √
end point distribution
√ √ √
SysPal specific features NA
√ √
Table 1. Pattern characteristics reported in our earlier TinPal paper [Tupsamudre et al. 2018], SysPal paper [Cho et al. 2017] and the
current submission (for both TinPal and SysPal).
online study show that 1-dot and 2-dot SysPal policies improved the guessing resistance of 3 × 3 patterns without much
impacting memorability. The authors of SysPal paper also reported few pattern characteristics such as line segment
frequencies, dot frequencies, start point distribution, end point distribution and SysPal specific features such as position
of mandated dots and distance between mandated dots (Table 1). However, they did not report important characteristics
such as stroke length, knight moves, overlaps, direction changes and intersections which are considered to be effective
against guessing attacks [Aviv et al. 2015; Tupsamudre et al. 2017; Uellenbeck et al. 2013] and shoulder-surfing attacks
[Andriotis et al. 2014; Aviv and Fichter 2014; Song et al. 2015; Sun et al. 2014; Zezschwitz et al. 2015]. Further, some of
the characteristics reported in the SysPal paper [Cho et al. 2017] were not reported in our TinPal paper [Tupsamudre
et al. 2018].
To sum up, previous studies [Cho et al. 2017; Tupsamudre et al. 2018] separately collected SysPal and TinPal patterns
under different settings (online versus lab) and evaluated them using different criterias (as depicted in Table 1). Therefore,
it was important to collect TinPal and SysPal patterns under similar settings and evaluate them with the same criteria.
In the current paper, we aim to close this gap. Specifically, our new contributions are as follows.
• We conduct a new user study with 147 participants and collect 3× 3 patterns using three different SysPal policies,
i.e., 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot (section 4). We ensured that the setup used in the new study is identical to our earlier
study [Tupsamudre et al. 2018] and the same participant is not enrolled in more than one group. Therefore, we
have five different groups (Original, TinPal, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot) and total 246 (99 + 147) participants with
each group containing at least 48 participants.
• We perform detailed security analysis of patterns created across all five groups using various characteristics
including pattern length, stroke length, knight moves, overlaps, direction changes, intersections, dot frequencies,
segment frequencies, start point distribution and end point distribution (Table 1). We also analyse the position
of the mandated dots in the SysPal patterns. Further, we measure the guessing resistance of patterns in all
five groups using Markov model based guessing algorithm. We train separate Markov models on two different
datasets, one collected in our current study and one collected in [Tupsamudre et al. 2017]. We refer the reader to
section 5 for more details.
• We compare memorability and efficiency of patterns created in all five groups (section 6). We measure memo-
rability in terms of the number of participants who successfully recalled the patterns and the number of login
attempts during the recall phase. We measure efficiency using the pattern creation time, pattern redraw time and
pattern recall time.
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Notations. To make it easier when referring to a particular pattern, we label all dots arranged in 3 × 3 grid in the
row-major order, where the upper-left dot is labelled as 1 and the lower-right dot is labelled as 9 as shown in Figure 1a.
A pattern is therefore represented as an ordered sequence of dots, e.g., 5213847 (Figure 2a). When referring to a line
segment (connection) between two consecutive dots i and j in a pattern, we use the notation i → j. For instance, the
line segment between consecutive dots 3 and 8 in the pattern 5213847 is represented as 3 → 8. The line segments used
for creating 3 × 3 patterns are not all similar. For instance, the line segments 1 → 2, 1 → 3, 1 → 5, 1 → 6 and 1 → 9 all
have different physical lengths. To capture this physical length notion, we use the concept of stroke length [Aviv et al.
2015; Tupsamudre et al. 2017] which is defined as the sum of Euclidean distances of all line segments within the pattern.
In order to compute the Euclidean distance of a line segment, we label the upper-left dot in 3 × 3 grid as (0,0) and the
lower-right dot as (2,2). Thus, the Euclidean distance of the segment 1 → 2 is 1, that of 1 → 5 is √2, that of 1 → 3 is 2,
that of 1 → 6 is √5 and that of 1 → 9 is 2√2.
(a) 3 × 3 labels (b) Corner (Simple) (c) Corner (Knight) (d) Corner (Overlap)
(e) Center (f) Side (Simple) (g) Side (Knight) (h) Side (Overlap)
Fig. 1. Connectivity rules for corner, center and side dots depicted using three types of moves simple, knight and overlap.
1.1 TinPal Motivation
The pattern drawing rules of a 3 × 3 grid are difficult to comprehend. Further, all rules are never communicated to the
user before or while drawing the pattern. These rules are as follows [Uellenbeck et al. 2013]:
(R1) At least 4 dots must be selected.
(R2) No dot can be used more than once.
(R3) Only straight lines are allowed.
(R4) One cannot jump over dots not visited before.
We observed that rules (R1), (R2) and (R3) are enforced by the original pattern lock interface. For instance, if the user
creates a pattern with less than four dots, the existing pattern lock interface rejects the pattern and displays an error
message that says “Connect at least 4 dots. Try Again". Further, it allows two dots to be connected using straight lines
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only. However, there is no mechanism in the original interface to inform users about rule (R4). As a result, users might not
be aware of all feasible connection options. We give an example. Consider different connection choices pertaining to dot
1 in 3 × 3 grid.
(1) One can connect dot i to dot j that is one unit away in the horizontal direction or one unit away in the vertical
direction or one unit away in both directions. We refer to such line segments as simple moves. The line segments
1 → 2, 1 → 4 and 1 → 5 depicted in Figure 1b are examples of simple moves. Previous studies show that a
majority of users employ only simple moves in their pattern [Aviv et al. 2015; Cho et al. 2017; Tupsamudre et al.
2017; Uellenbeck et al. 2013].
(2) More complex connections are also possible from dot 1 which is not immediately obvious from the pattern
drawing rules. One can connect dot i to dot j that is two units away in the horizontal (vertical) direction and one
unit away in the vertical (horizontal) direction. Such connections are referred to as knight moves. For instance,
one can connect dot 1 to dot 6 or dot 8 using slanted straight lines 1 → 6 and 1 → 8 as shown in Figure 1c.
(3) Rule (R4) on the other hand implies that dot i can be connected to dot j directly, if all dots along the (straight
line) path are already connected. Such connections are referred to as overlaps. For instance, one can connect dot
1 to dot 3 if dot 2 is already connected. This connection can happen in two ways.
(a) Overlapping segment : It occurs when the connection to dot 2 is immediately followed by dots 1 and 3. In this
case, the line segment 2 → 1 is covered completely by the line segment 1 → 3. An example of such pattern is
5213847 (Figure 2a).
(b) Overlapping dot : It occurs when the connection to dot 2 is followed by some other dot(s) followed by dots 1
and 3. An example of such pattern is 62413589 (Figure 2b).
Similarly, one can also join 1 → 7 if dot 4 is already connected or join 1 → 9 if dot 5 is already connected (Figure
1d).
(a) Pattern 5213847 (b) Pattern 62413589 (c) Pattern 528463971 (d) Pattern 294381675
Fig. 2. Illustration of simple, knight and overlap moves.
Many research studies demonstrate that knight moves and overlaps play an important role in thwarting both guessing
attacks [Andriotis et al. 2014] and shoulder-surfing attacks [Song et al. 2015; Sun et al. 2014; Zezschwitz et al. 2015].
However, there is no mechanism in the original pattern lock interface to inform users about the feasibility of such moves.
Consequently, users restrict themselves to simple moves such as 1 → 2, 1 → 4 or 1 → 5 to create their pattern. Spelling
out these connection choices in text form is a tedious task. This problem is further aggravated since the connection
choices vary depending on whether the dot is located at the corner, center or to the side in 3× 3 grid as shown in Figure
1. There are four corner dots {1, 3, 7, 9}, one center dot {5} and four side dots {2, 4, 6, 8}. A corner dot can be connected
directly to any of the five non-corner dots (Figure 1b,1c), center dot can be connected directly to any of the remaining
eight dots (Figure 1e) while a side dot can be connected directly to seven dots (Figure 1f,1g). Because of rule (R4), a
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corner dot can be connected to any other corner dot if the side dot between them is already connected ((Figure 1d),
whereas a side dot can be connected to the remaining eighth dot if dot 5 is already connected (Figure 1h).
#Overlaps Count Percentage
0 139,880 35.95%
1 159,480 40.98%
2 69,896 17.96%
3 16,912 4.35%
4 2,688 0.69%
5 256 0.07%
#Patterns 389,112 100%
Table 2. Theoretical distribution of overlaps in 3 × 3 patterns.
#Knight moves Count Percentage
0 10,096 2.60%
1 52,120 13.40%
2 109,496 28.14%
3 117,592 30.22%
4 71,488 18.37%
5 23,704 6.09%
6 4,240 1.09%
7 376 0.10%
#Patterns 389,112 100%
Table 3. Theoretical distribution of knight moves in 3 × 3 patterns.
Tables 2 and 3 show the distribution of overlaps and knight moves in all possible 3× 3 patterns (389,112) respectively.
If overlaps are never used in patterns, then the search space diminishes to 139,880, i.e., about 1/3rd of 389,112. On the
other hand, if knight moves are never used in patterns, then the search space reduces to just 10,096, i.e., about 1/40th of
389,112. The maximum number of overlaps that can occur is 5, and it is observed for instance in patterns that begin
with the center dot, followed by all side dots, followed by all corner dots. One such pattern (528463971) is shown in
Figure 2c. The maximum number of knight moves that can occur is 7, and it is observed in patterns that begin with a
side dot, followed by alternating corner and side dots, and optionally followed by the center dot. One such pattern
(294381675) is shown in Figure 2d.
1.2 Contribution
In this work, we alter the original 3 × 3 interface with a visual indicator mechanism to make users aware of different
connection choices. Specifically, as users draw their pattern, the new 3×3 interface highlights the next set of unconnected
dots that can be reached from the currently connected dot, thus making users aware of all available connection options
at each step during pattern creation as well as during recall. We refer to this highlighting interface as TinPal. We note
that unlike SysPal [Cho et al. 2017], the proposed interface does not force or persuade users to connect any particular
dot(s), instead it simply informs users about the set of next choices available from the currently connected dot.
The working of TinPal is illustrated in Figure 3. It shows a step-by-step snapshot of TinPal while the pattern is being
drawn by the user.
(1) Suppose that the user starts her pattern with dot 3. From dot 3, the user can visit any non-corner dot {2, 4, 5, 6, 8}.
However, the user cannot visit dot 1 as dot 2 is still unconnected or dot 7 as dot 5 is unconnected or dot 9 as dot 6
is unconnected (R4). Hence, only non-corner dots {2, 4, 5, 6, 8} are highlighted by TinPal as shown in Figure 3b.
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(a) 3 × 3 grid (b) Start dot 3 (c) Current dot 8 (d) Current dot 5 (e) Current dot 1
(f) Current dot 9 (g) Current dot 6 (h) Current dot 4 (i) Current dot 2 (j) Current dot 7
Fig. 3. A step-by-step illustration of pattern creation on TinPal. This interface highlights the next set of unconnected dots that can be
visited from the currently connected dot. The connection choices are conveyed to users in real-time while the pattern is being drawn.
The pattern created in the above example is 385196427.
(2) Next, the user visits dot 8 (knight move). From dot 8, the user can visit any dot except dot 2 as dot 5 is still not
connected (R4). Therefore, the set of unconnected dots {1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9} are highlighted as shown in Figure 3c.
(3) Subsequently, the user connects dot 5 (simple move). From dot 5, the user can visit any unconnected dot
{1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9} as highlighted in Figure 3d.
(4) The user chooses dot 1 (simple move). From there, the user can visit any unconnected non-corner dot {2, 4, 6}.
Since dot 5 is already connected, the user can also visit dot 9 (R4). However, the user cannot visit dot 7 as dot 4 is
not yet connected. Hence, the set {2, 4, 6, 9} is highlighted by TinPal as depicted in Figure 3e.
(5) Next choice is dot 9 (overlap). From there, the user can visit any unconnected non-corner dot {2, 4, 6}. Further,
since dot 8 is already connected, the user can now visit dot 7 (R4). Hence, the set {2, 4, 6, 7} is highlighted as
indicated in Figure 3f.
(6) Next, the user visits dot 6 (simple move). From dot 6, in addition to unconnected dots 2 and 7, the user can also
visit dot 4 since dot 5 is already connected (R4). Therefore, the set {2, 4, 7} is highlighted in Figure 3g.
(7) Next choice is dot 4 (overlap). From there, the user can go to either dot 2 or dot 7 as highlighted in Figure 3h.
(8) The user connects dot 2 (simple move). Now, the only choice available is dot 7 which is highlighted in Figure 3i.
(9) Finally, the user connects dot 7 (knight move) and the pattern 385196427 is recorded as shown in Figure 3j.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We enhance the original 3 × 3 interface with a visual indicator mechanism to help users choose more diverse
patterns. Specifically, the new interface, referred to as TinPal highlights the set of reachable dots from the
currently connected dot, thus making pattern drawing rules more salient to users. The highlighting mechanism
works in real-time while the pattern is being drawn.
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• We also describe an algorithm that takes the currently connected dot as an input and outputs the next set of
unconnected dots that can be visited from the current dot in 3 × 3 grid.
• We evaluate the impact of our visual indicator mechanism with a comparative user study involving 246 (99+147)
participants. Specifically, we measure the usability and security of 3 × 3 patterns created using the original
interface, three SysPal policies (1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot), and TinPal. Our results show that participants in the
TinPal group used significantly large number of dots and complex features such overlaps, knight moves and
direction changes to create their pattern as compared to the other groups.
• We also estimate the guessing resistance of patterns created in all five groups using a Markov model based
guessing algorithm. Within first 20 attempts, the guessing algorithm cracked 12% patterns in the Original group,
10% patterns in the 1-dot group, 8% patterns in the 2-dot group, 20% patterns in the 3-dot group, but none (0%) in
the TinPal group. Another Markov model trained on [Tupsamudre et al. 2017] dataset cracked 12.24% patterns
in the Original group, 8% patterns in the 1-dot group, 6.12% patterns in the 2-dot group, 18.75% patterns in the
3-dot group, but only 4% patterns in the TinPal group.
The organization of this paper is as follows. First, we provide a brief overview of graphical passwords and review the
work related to the security of the pattern lock scheme. Subsequently, we describe the design choices we made along
with the working mechanism for the proposed interface, TinPal. Next, we describe the user study, and present security
and usability results. Finally, we discuss the future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
Graphical passwords are considered to be promising alternative to textual passwords since many research studies
[Paivio et al. 1968; Shepard 1967; Yuille 1983] show that graphical information is easier to remember than textual
information. Based on the difficulty of retrieving graphical information from the visual memory, graphical schemes are
broadly divided into three categories [Biddle et al. 2012]: recognition-based, cued recall-based and recall-based. A typical
example of the recognition-based scheme is PassFaces [Brostoff and Sasse 2000] in which the user selects a face from a
set of nine image faces during registration and correctly recognizes the face among a set of decoy image faces during
login. To attain the desired level of security, there are multiple iterations in PassFaces, with each iteration employing a
different set of nine images. An example of the cued recall-based scheme is Pass-points [Wiedenbeck et al. 2005] in
which the user selects a sequence of points on a system-assigned image. During login, this image acts as a memory cue
that helps the user to recall the selected points in the correct order. An example of the recall-based scheme is Pass-Go
[Tao and Adams 2008] in which the user draws one or more strokes on a n × n grid. The 3 × 3 pattern lock scheme is a
special case of Pass-Go, where n is set to 3 so that the grid could fit on small screen of smartphones.
2.1 Android Pattern Lock
Androids’ pattern lock scheme is the most widely deployed graphical based authentication system on smartphones,
hence its security has been well studied in the literature. In 2010, Aviv et al. demonstrated that it is possible to reconstruct
the user’s entire pattern from the oily traces left on the screen [Aviv et al. 2010]. This attack is popularly known as
smudge attack. Later in 2013, Andriotis et al. showed that it is possible to recover the entire pattern even from the
partial traces by exploiting users’ biased choices [Andriotis et al. 2013]. They surveyed 144 participants and found that
more than 50% of the participants started their pattern from the upper-left dot. Further analysis revealed that 18.75% of
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the participants used the path 1 → 2 → 3 in their pattern. These observations along with the partial physical traces
reduced the search space drastically.
In 2013, Uellenbeck et al. found that users’ pattern choices are biased and prone to guessing attacks [Uellenbeck et al.
2013]. They collected approximately 2900 patterns from 584 participants on 5 different layouts. Their analysis revealed
that most users create 3 × 3 patterns with horizontal (e.g., 1 → 2) and vertical strokes (e.g., 1 → 4) which reduces the
security of 3× 3 patterns to just 3-digit random PINs. They also found that patterns created on a circular interface (eight
dots on the circumference and one dot in the center) were more secure than 3× 3 patterns. Similar results were reported
by Tupsamudre et al. [Tupsamudre et al. 2017]. They proposed a different circular interface, called Pass-O, with all nine
dots on the circumference and evaluated it with a large-scale study (21,053 users, 123,190 patterns). However, both
studies [Tupsamudre et al. 2017; Uellenbeck et al. 2013] focused on security and lacked rigorous usability evaluation. In
2016, Aviv et al. [Aviv et al. 2015] studied the security of 4 × 4 patterns and found that the majority of them are just
extended versions of 3 × 3 patterns, and hence insecure.
Most graphical password schemes are susceptible to shoulder-surfing attacks [Biddle et al. 2012]. In 2015, Zezschwitz
et al. performed a systematic evaluation of the shoulder-surfing susceptibility of the pattern lock scheme [Zezschwitz
et al. 2015]. They found that line visibility, pattern length, number of knight moves, number of overlaps and number of
intersections (refer to section 5.1 for definitions) play an important role in thwarting shoulder-surfing attacks. More
recently, Aviv et al. showed that different viewing angles, hand positions and phone sizes can also affect the efficacy of
shoulder-surfing attacks [Aviv et al. 2017]. In order to encourage users to create visually complex patterns, various
strength meters have been proposed in the literature [Andriotis et al. 2014; Song et al. 2015; Sun et al. 2014]. These
strength meters typically nudge users to draw longer, and complex patterns containing overlaps, knight moves, direction
changes and intersections. However, the impact of these strength meters can be limited if users are not aware of all
possible connection choices while creating their pattern.
Recently, Ye et al. demonstrated a side-channel attack that recovered 95% of the 3 × 3 patterns from a video recorded
using a smartphone within just five attempts [Ye et al. 2018]. Further, they could uncover 97.5% of the complex patterns
in just one attempt. However, we note that for such an attack to succeed, certain events are required to happen. First,
the user unlocks her device in public. During the same time, the attacker who is at a distance of 2 meters from the user
records the entire unlocking process without raising any suspicion. Further, the attack requires that both the user’s
fingertip and part of the target device surface are visible during recording. Subsequently, the attacker processes the
recorded video offline and infers a set of candidate patterns using a computer vision algorithm. Finally, the attacker
gets physical access to the target device for a short duration in order to try the inferred candidate patterns. In our
work, we use a more practical threat model as described in [Aviv et al. 2015; Cho et al. 2017; Tupsamudre et al. 2017;
Uellenbeck et al. 2013], i.e., we evaluate the security of 3 × 3 patterns against a dictionary based guessing attack where an
attacker gets access to an Android device for a short duration, and attempts most probable (popular) patterns first to unlock
it. Interestingly, when [Ye et al. 2018] asked participants to infer complex patterns by watching the pattern unlocking
videos, the success rate was less than 10% in five attempts. The participants could adjust the video speed and watch
video multiple times for a period of 10 minutes.
To improve the security of the pattern lock scheme, Siadati et al. proposed a persuasive interface that suggests a
random starting point to the user [Siadati et al. 2015] while Cho et al. proposed three SysPal policies that mandate
users to include one, two or three randomly assigned dots at any position in the pattern [Cho et al. 2017]. However,
we note that the use of system-assigned random dots does not ensure that the resulting patterns will exhibit secure
characteristics such as knight moves and overlaps simply because users may not be aware about the feasibility of such
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connections. In fact, Cho et al. found that in all three SysPal policies, the most frequently used segments were 1 → 2
and 2 → 3, and i → i + 1 was more frequently used than i + 1 → i for all i = 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, implying that most patterns
were drawn from left to right.
On the other hand, TinPal, the highlighting interface proposed in our earlier work [Tupsamudre et al. 2018], does not
mandate users to connect any specific dot(s), it just informs them about the set of reachable dots in each step during
pattern creation as well as during recall. Our study results show that patterns drawn on TinPal were composed using
significantly longer strokes and large number of knight moves, overlaps and direction changes as compared to those
created using 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot SysPal policies. Moreover, the proportion of SysPal patterns cracked in 20 attempts
were: 10% (1-dot), 8% (2-dot) and 20% (3-dot). These numbers suggest (also stated in [Cho et al. 2017]) that mandating
too many points could potentially reduce the overall password space. Further, none of the TinPal patterns were cracked in
20 attempts.
3 INTERFACE DESIGN AND MECHANICS
We employ two design principles, namely, visibility and consistency [Rogers et al. 2011], to enhance the original 3 × 3
interface. According to the visibility principle, the system should have proper mechanisms to convey to users what
actions are possible. The visual indicator mechanism in TinPal makes the set of available choices visible to users.
Specifically, it highlights the next set of unconnected dots that can be visited from the currently connected dot to help
users choose diverse 3 × 3 patterns. This highlighting of dots happens in real-time while the pattern is being drawn.
The consistency principle on the other hand makes the interface intuitive to use. The highlighting of dots in TinPal
happens not only during pattern creation, but also during recall. This eliminates the confusion since the behaviour of
the interface is consistent during creation and recall. Further, the highlighting of dots could also serve as cue when the
user is trying to retrieve the pattern from her memory. However, we note that the highlighting of nodes can potentially
leak the information about dots used in the pattern. Therefore, we can also provide an option to turn off the highlighting
mode once the pattern is created.
TinPal also retains the feedback mechanism of the original interface, thereby enforcing the minimum pattern length
requirement on 3 × 3 grid [Uellenbeck et al. 2013]. For instance, if the user connects less than 4 dots, it displays the
feedback message, “Connect at least 4 dots. Try again". Further, as only unconnected dots are highlighted by TinPal, the
user is informed that a dot can be connected only once.
3.1 Mechanics
Now, we present an algorithm that takes the currently connected dot d as an input and outputs the next set of
unconnected dots R that are reachable from the current dot d . This algorithm is invoked whenever the user connects a
new dot on TinPal. The set of dots returned by this algorithm are highlighted on the interface. To simplify the algorithm,
we define a neighbourhood relation on 3× 3 grid. We say that dot j is a neighbour of dot i on 3× 3 grid if j is the nearest
dot in any of the eight directions (north, north-east, east, south-east, south, south-west, west and north-west). Figure
4 depicts the neighbourhood of dots 1, 2 and 5 in all possible directions. Dot 1 being a corner dot has 3 neighbours,
i.e., dots 2 (east), 4 (south) and 5 (south-east). Dot 2 being a side dot has 5 neighbours, i.e., dots 1 (west), 3 (east), 4
(south-west), 5 (south), and 6 (south-east), whereas the center dot 5 has all other dots as its neighbours.
Algorithm 1 starts by adding all unconnected dots to the set R (line 4). Then it eliminates those dots from R that are
not reachable from the current dot d (lines 6-12). For elimination, the algorithm employs Table 4 which contains the
neighbours of all 9 dots in 3×3 grid. The table has nine rows corresponding to each dot and eight columns corresponding
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(a) Neighbours of dot 1 (b) Neighbours of dot 2 (c) Neighbours of dot 5
Fig. 4. Neighbours of dot 1 (corner), dot 2 (side) and dot 5 (center).
Dot N ↑ NE↗ E→ SE↘ S ↓ SW ↙ W ← NW ↖
1 ⊥ ⊥ 2 5 4 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
2 ⊥ ⊥ 3 6 5 4 1 ⊥
3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 6 5 2 ⊥
4 1 2 5 8 7 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
5 2 3 6 9 8 7 4 1
6 3 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 9 8 5 2
7 4 5 8 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
8 5 6 9 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 7 4
9 6 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 8 5
Table 4. Neighbourhood table for 3 × 3 grid.
to each direction. If a dot i does not have any neighbour in a particular direction δ , then the corresponding entry in
the neighbourhood table is marked with symbol ⊥ (indicating empty). To eliminate the unreachable dots from the set
R, the algorithm scans the entire dth row, i.e., all 8 neighbours of the current dot d in the neighbourhood table (lines
6-12). If the entry in the direction δ is marked with ⊥ then the algorithm does not take any action. Otherwise, the
algorithm checks if the neighbouring dot e in the direction δ is already connected (line 9). If it is not, then the algorithm
eliminates the neighbour of the neighbouring dot e in the direction δ from R (line 10). Finally, the set R consisting of
reachable dots from the current dot d is returned for highlighting on 3 × 3 grid (line 13). We illustrate the working of
this elimination algorithm with an example (Figure 5).
(a) Start dot 1 (b) Current dot 5 (c) Current dot 3 (d) Current dot 7 (e) Pattern 1537
Fig. 5. A step-by-step illustration of pattern creation on TinPal. This interface highlights the next set of unconnected dots that can be
reached from the currently connected dot as computed by our elimination algorithm. The connection choices are conveyed to users
in real-time while the pattern is being drawn. The pattern created in the above example is 1537.
(1) Suppose that the user starts her pattern by connecting dot 1. Subsequently, the elimination algorithm is invoked
to determine the set of unconnected dots R reachable from the current dot 1. The algorithm begins by adding all
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Algorithm 1 Elimination Algorithm
1: procedure Elimination Alдorithm
2: Input: Current dot d , setU of unconnected dots and 9 × 8 neighbourhood table
3: Output: Set R of unconnected dots that can be reached from the current dot d
4: R ←U
5: //scan the entire dth row (all 8 neighbours) in the neighbourhood table
6: for δ ∈ {1, . . . , 8} do
7: e ← table[d][δ ]
8: //if neighbouring dot e in direction δ is unconnected then eliminate neighbour of e in direction δ
9: if e ,⊥ && !isConnected(e) then
10: R ← R \ {table[e][δ ]}
11: end if
12: end for
13: return R
14: end procedure
unconnected dots {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} to the set R (line 4). The algorithm then scans the first row (corresponding
to dot 1) of the neighbourhood table to identify and remove the unreachable dots in the set R (lines 6-12). As its
neighbour in the east (dot 2) is still unconnected, the algorithm removes dot 3 (which lies further to the east of
dot 2) from the set R (line 10). This elimination occurs due to the overlap rule (R4) which says that dot 1 cannot
be directly connected to dot 3 as dot 2 is still unconnected. Similarly, as the south neighbour dot 4 is yet to be
connected, the algorithm removes dot 7 (which lies further to the south of dot 4) from the set R. Also, as the
south-east neighbour dot 5 is unconnected, the algorithm removes dot 9 (which lies further to the south-east of
dot 5) from the set R. Therefore, the set R = {2, 4, 5, 6, 8} is determined to be reachable and returned (line 13) for
highlighting on 3 × 3 grid (Figure 5a).
(2) Subsequently, the user chooses dot 5. The algorithm adds all unconnected dots {2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9} to the set R (line
4). The algorithm then scans the fifth row of the neighbourhood table to identify and remove the unreachable
dots (from dot 5) from the set R (lines 6-12). As all dots are reachable from dot 5, none of the dots is eliminated
from the set R and {2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9} is returned (line 13) for highlighting purpose (Figure 5b).
(3) Next, the user chooses dot 3. The algorithm adds all unconnected dots {2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9} to the set R (line 4). The
algorithm then scans the third row of the neighbourhood table to identify and remove the unreachable dots
(from dot 3) from the set R (lines 6-12). As its neighbour in the south, dot 6 is still unconnected, the algorithm
removes dot 9 (which lies further to the south of dot 6) from the set R (line 10). This elimination occurs due to the
overlap rule (R4) which says that dot 3 cannot be directly connected to dot 9 as dot 6 is still unconnected. As dot
5 which lies to the south-west of dot 3 is already connected, dot 9 which lies further to the south-west of dot 5 is
retained in the set R. Therefore, the set R = {2, 4, 6, 7, 8} is returned (line 13) for highlighting purpose (Figure 5c).
(4) The user chooses dot 7. The algorithm adds all unconnected dots {2, 4, 6, 8, 9} to the set R (line 4). The algorithm
then scans the seventh row of the neighbourhood table to identify and remove the unreachable dots (from dot 7)
from the set R (lines 6-12). As its neighbour in the east, dot 8 is still unconnected, the algorithm removes dot 9
(which lies further to the east of dot 8) from the set R (line 10). This elimination occurs due to the overlap rule
(R4) which says that dot 7 cannot be directly connected to dot 9 as dot 8 is still unconnected. Therefore, the set
R = {2, 4, 6, 8} is returned (line 13) for highlighting on 3 × 3 grid (Figure 5d).
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(5) Finally, the user releases her finger and the pattern 1537 is recorded as shown in Figure 5e.
4 USER STUDY
To evaluate the impact of TinPal on users’ pattern choices, we conducted two separate user studies. The first study was
conducted in lab during August 2017. Participants were recruited using internal mailing lists within our organization.
A total of 99 users responded to our e-mail and completed the first study. Out of 99 participants, 49 were randomly
assigned to the Original group and 50 were assigned to the TinPal group.
• Original. Participants in this group created their pattern on the original 3 × 3 interface.
• TinPal. Participants in this group created their pattern on TinPal which highlights the next set of available dots
that can be visited from the currently connected dot.
The second study was also conducted in lab during January 2018. The purpose of this study was to collect 3× 3 patterns
created using three different SysPal interfaces [Cho et al. 2017]. We did not invite participants who already participated
in the first study. A total of 147 users responded to our email and completed the second study. Out of 147 participants,
50 were randomly assigned to the 1-dot group, 49 to the 2-dot group and 48 to the 3-dot group.
• 1-dot. Participants in this group were required to include one system-assigned dot in their 3 × 3 pattern.
• 2-dot. Participants in this group were required to include two system-assigned dots in their 3 × 3 pattern.
• 3-dot. Participants in this group were required to include three system-assigned dots in their 3 × 3 pattern.
Therefore, a total of 246 participants enrolled and completed our studies, with each group containing at least 48
participants.
A research study [Aviv et al. 2016] found statistically significant difference between patterns collected on the
mobile device of participants versus patterns collected using other collection methods. Therefore, we opted for pattern
collection on the participant’s own mobile device. To make our study available across all mobile devices, we created an
HTML/Javascript web application using Java J2EE platform. Thus, participants could participate in the study using
any standard web-browser on their mobile device without having to install any additional software. We simulated the
look and feel of Android pattern lock as closely as possible. Participants were given a pen and a chocolate worth $2 for
completing the study. There is no IRB in our organization for approving studies involving human subjects. However,
we took all necessary steps in order to be compliant with privacy regulations. The data was collected anonymously
after obtaining consent from the participants. Further, the collected data was used for research purpose only.
4.1 Participants
The demographics of the participants are summarized in Table 5. Majority of participants were between 20 and 30
years of age, and right handed. The proportion of male participants in the experiment was slightly higher than that of
the female participants. Also the proportion of participants with a background in Computer Science (CS)/Information
Technology (IT)/Security exceeded those with no such background. Further, all participants had at least an undergraduate
degree and belonged to the same nationality. We found no statistically significant difference in gender, handedness, age
or background of participants across five groups (p > 0.01, corrected two-tailed Fischer’s Exact Test).
During experiments, we also asked participants questions related to the mobile device they own and the screen locks
they ever used (if any). These device and lock statistics are also presented in Table 5. A large fraction of participants
used Android phones. Further, majority of them were familiar with the Android pattern lock scheme. We found no
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statistically significant difference in the mobile OS experience and pattern lock familiarity across five groups (p > 0.01,
corrected two-tailed Fischer’s Exact Test).
Original TinPal 1-dot 2-dot 3-dot
Gender
Male 51.02% 56% 64% 51.02% 58.33%
Female 48.98% 44% 36% 48.98% 41.67%
Handedness
Right 95.92% 98% 96% 93.88% 87.50%
Left 4.08% 2% 4% 6.12% 12.50%
Age Group
20-25 67.35% 80% 70% 61.22% 70.83%
26-30 26.53% 16% 20% 24.49% 16.67%
31-35 6.12% 4% 10% 14.29% 12.50%
Background
CS/IT/Security 59.18% 54% 68% 63.26% 70.83%
Others 40.82% 46% 32% 36.74% 29.17%
Mobile OS
Android 95.92% 92% 90% 93.88% 91.67%
iOS 2.04% 6% 8% 4.08% 6.25%
Windows 2.04% 2% 2% 2.04% 2.08%
Screen-lock
Android Pattern 59.18% 58% 48% 65.31% 58.33%
PIN 30.61% 38% 38% 26.53% 33.33%
Password 24.29% 26% 18% 16.33% 10.42%
Fingerprint 38.78% 42% 50% 57.14% 35.42%
Slide-to-lock 24.29% 26% 2% 4.08% 14.58%
None 10.20% 4% 6% 2.04% 10.42%
#Participants 49 50 50 49 48
Table 5. Demographics of participants across five groups.
4.2 Procedure
The structure of our study is similar to the one described in [Loge et al. 2016]. The study was conducted in lab in
7 stages: 1) Survey Information, 2) Brief introduction to Android Lock Patterns, 3) Training, 4) Pattern Creation, 5)
Distraction Task, 6) Questions on demographics, device and screen-lock, and 7) Pattern Recall. The details of each stage
are given below.
(1) Survey Information. Participants were requested to open the study link using a browser on their mobile device. On
visiting the link, participants were shown the information page (Figure 6a) which contained a brief information
about the study, its purpose and the data usage policy. This page was common to all groups.
(2) Introduction to Pattern Lock. After agreeing to participate in the study, participants were shown a sample 3 × 3
grid along with the pattern creation rules. Participants in the TinPal group were informed about the highlighting
feature as depicted in Figure 6b while participants in the control, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups were informed
about the four pattern creation rules given below [Uellenbeck et al. 2013]. In addition, participants in all SysPal
groups were also informed about the mandatory usage of the system-assigned random dots.
(R1) At least 4 dots must be selected.
(R2) No dot can be used more than once.
(R3) Only straight lines are allowed.
(R4) One cannot jump over dots not visited before.
(3) Training. To ensure that participants in each group become familiar with their assigned interface, we had a
training page where the participants could explore the assigned interface by drawing as many patterns as
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(a) Survey Information (b) Introduction (TinPal) (c) Create Pattern
(d) Create Pattern (1-dot) (e) Create Pattern (2-dot) (f) Create Pattern (3-dot)
(g) Puzzle (Simple) (h) Puzzle (Medium) (i) Puzzle (Complex)
Fig. 6. Selected screens of the user study.
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they like. Further, we made sure that for a given participant, the system-assigned dot(s) do not change across
different trials, i.e., the system-assigned dot(s) remain the same even after pattern reset. For instance, once the
system randomly selects dot 4 for a participant in the 1-dot group, the participant continues to see the same
system-assigned dot even after she clicks on the reset button. Otherwise, the participant could click the reset
button until she gets system-assigned dot(s) of her choice which would defeat the purpose of SysPal policies.
The assigned dot(s) remained the same even in the next stage (Pattern Creation).
(4) Pattern Creation. After completing the training, participants were given the smartphone scenario [Loge et al.
2016] in which they were asked to create a new pattern to protect their mobile device. Participants in all groups
could create any pattern of their choice (Figure 6c), however participants in the 1-dot group, 2-dot group and
3-dot group were also asked to use system-assigned dots in their pattern (Figure 6d, 6e, 6f). After submitting
a valid pattern, participants in all groups were asked to re-confirm their pattern. If the confirmation failed,
participants could try creating their pattern again, however in case of participants in 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot
groups, the system-assigned dot(s) remain the same.
(5) Distraction Task. After creating the pattern, participants were given a distraction task involving graphical puzzles
to solve. Specifically, participants were shown a target object at the top, and they had to identify which one of the
bottom two objects matches the target as illustrated in Figures 6g, 6h and 6i. The purpose of these puzzles was to
clear the visual working memory of participants. The dataset required for building the puzzles was downloaded
from [puz 2019]. It consisted of 15 mental rotation puzzles. Based on the difficulty level, we manually categorized
all 15 puzzles into three categories, namely, easy,medium and complex. Each category contained 5 mental rotation
puzzles. Examples of easy, medium and complex puzzles are provided in Figures 6g, 6h and 6i respectively. Every
participant had to attempt three graphical puzzles, one (picked randomly) from each category.
(6) Questions. To further prolong the recall stage, we asked participants few questions pertaining to demographics
(gender, age, handedness and educational background), their mobile device and the screen-lock they ever used (if
any).
(7) Pattern Recall. Finally, participants were asked to recall their pattern within five attempts. The working of
the TinPal interface was consistent during creation as well as recall, i.e., the highlighting of dots happened
not only during pattern creation, but also during recall. Participants in the SysPal groups were not shown the
system-assigned dots.
4.3 User Data Collected
To compare the usability and security of 3 × 3 patterns created on five different interfaces (Original, TinPal, 1-dot, 2-dot
and 3-dot), we collected the following data points about every participant in each group:
• assigned interface
• system-assigned random dot(s) in 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups
• number of patterns tried in the training stage
• time spent in the training stage
• number of patterns tried in the creation stage
• final pattern selected in the creation stage
• time spent in drawing the final selected pattern
• number of redraw attempts
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• time spent in redrawing the pattern
• time needed to solve the distraction task
• survey responses
• time needed to answer the survey
• number of recall attempts
• time spent in recalling the pattern
4.4 Statistical Tests
We compared categorical data such as gender, age-group, handedness, background, mobile OS, screen-lock in use,
starting and ending points of patterns, and the number of unlocking attempts (maximum five) across all groups using
two-tailed Fischer’s Exact test (FET). Since pattern characteristics such as pattern length, stroke length, direction
changes and intersections, and usability metrics such as pattern creation time, redraw time and recall time were not
normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test rejects the null hypothesis that data is normal with a p < 0.01), we performed
two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test [Marx et al. 2016] with a significance level of α = 0.01. As there
are five groups, 10 pairwise comparisons were performed. To account for multiple statistical comparisons, we applied
Bonferroni correction, i.e., we altered the value of α to 0.01/10 = 0.001, and claimed statistical significance if p < 0.001.
We claimed the result to be of possible significant interest if p < 0.01. We also compared the distribution of starting
point and ending point choices of all groups using the entropy measure:
Entropy H =
9∑
i=1
pi · loд2(1/pi ) (1)
where pi is the probability of choosing a dot i as starting (or ending) point.
4.5 Limitations
We performed two separate studies to collect TinPal and SysPal patterns, however we ensured that the setup used in
both studies is identical and the same participants are not enrolled in more than one group. Similar data collection
strategies have been reported in the previous studies [Aviv et al. 2015; Uellenbeck et al. 2013]. The sample used in
our comparative study is younger and more tech-savvy, and therefore, may have better memory than average which
could influence the results. Further, as the study was conducted in a lab, the sample is small (246 participants), and
with a large sample we could observe further patterns. However, the objective of our study was to determine whether
informing users about connection options through the highlighting mechanism had any impact on their pattern choices
which we found to be statistically significant with this small sample.
Further, it is not easy to demonstrate if patterns created in the user study are realistic. Fahl et al. attempted to address
the questions related to ecological validity in password studies and found that passwords created by participants in
a role-play scenario resemble their real passwords [Fahl et al. 2013]. They also found that passwords created in the
lab study were more representative of actual passwords than those created in the online study and priming subjects
does not make any difference. Therefore, we conducted our study in lab and asked participants to create a pattern for
the smartphone scenario [Loge et al. 2016]. Moreover, recently researchers found statistically significant differences
between patterns collected on the mobile device of participants and patterns collected using other collection methods
[Aviv et al. 2016]. Therefore, we asked participants to create pattern on their own mobile device.
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5 SECURITY RESULTS
To evaluate the impact of TinPal on users’ pattern choices, we compared certain characteristics of patterns created
across five groups. Specifically, we looked at the characteristics such as pattern length, stroke length, knight moves,
overlaps, starting points, ending points, direction changes and intersections. These characteristics are considered to be
effective in preventing guessing attacks [Andriotis et al. 2014, 2013; Aviv et al. 2015; Tupsamudre et al. 2017; Uellenbeck
et al. 2013] as well as shoulder-surfing attacks [Song et al. 2015; Sun et al. 2014; Zezschwitz et al. 2015]. We also measured
the guessability of patterns across all groups using an attack technique based on n-gram Markov model [Aviv et al.
2015; Cho et al. 2017; Siadati et al. 2015; Tupsamudre et al. 2017; Uellenbeck et al. 2013].
5.1 Pattern Characteristics
Table 6 compares the characteristics of patterns created across all groups. The mean, the median and the standard
deviation of each pattern characteristic is shown in the table. The distribution of TinPal patterns (as measured by mean,
median and standard deviation) is relatively more similar to the distribution of theoretical patterns (389,112) compared
to the other groups. We delve into each characteristic in more detail.
Characteristic Original TinPal 1-dot 2-dot 3-dot Theory
Pattern Length
Mean 6.08 7.04 5.90 6.04 5.92 7.97
Standard deviation 1.90 1.60 1.90 1.94 1.58 1.02
Median 5 7 5 6 6 8
Stroke Length
Mean 6.05 8.39 5.80 5.81 5.50 11.03
Standard deviation 2.63 2.69 2.56 2.39 1.91 2.24
Median 5.41 8.27 5 5.83 5 11
Knight Moves
Mean 0.41 1.36 0.30 0.18 0.23 2.71
Standard deviation 0.94 0.92 0.71 0.49 0.52 1.23
Median 0 1 0 0 0 3
Overlaps
Mean 0.12 0.72 0.20 0.10 0.06 0.93
Standard deviation 0.33 1.02 0.49 0.37 0.32 0.88
Median 0 0 0 0 0 1
Direction Changes
Mean 1.57 2.9 1.24 1.43 1.27 4.76
Standard deviation 1.40 1.91 1.36 1.59 1.30 1.31
Median 2 3 1 1 1 5
Intersections
Mean 0.43 0.64 0.22 0.10 0.06 2.58
Standard deviation 1.99 1.25 0.65 0.31 0.32 2.13
Median 0 0 0 0 0 2
#Bigrams (Segments) 44 59 44 37 36 72
#Patterns 49 50 50 49 48 389,112
Table 6. Comparison of pattern characteristics across five groups. The table also shows statistics pertaining to all possible 389,112
patterns.
Pattern length. It is the most basic feature and represents the number of dots connected in the pattern [Andrio-
tis et al. 2014; Aviv et al. 2015; Song et al. 2015; Sun et al. 2014; Tupsamudre et al. 2017; Uellenbeck et al. 2013; Zezschwitz
et al. 2015]. The theoretical distribution of pattern length is shown in Table 7. Theoretically, more than 90% of the
patterns consist of at least 7 dots. Figure 7a depicts the pattern length distribution in all five groups. In the TinPal group,
the number of participants who used at least 7 dots to connect their pattern was 64%, whereas in the Original, 1-dot,
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2-dot and 3-dot groups the numbers were 40.82%, 32%, 38.78% and 29.17% respectively (Figure 7a). Consequently, the
average number of dots used for creating patterns in the TinPal group was relatively higher (7.04) than the other groups
(Table 6). We found significant difference in the distribution of pattern length between the TinPal group and all SysPal
groups except 2-dot group (all p < 0.001, corrected two-tailed WMW test). Further, we found significant interest in the
pattern length distribution between the TinPal group and the remaining two groups, 2-dot and Original (all p < 0.01,
corrected two-tailed WMW test). The results of all pairwise comparisons are shown in Table 14 (Appendix A). We
marked the entry with value p < 0.001 in the table using (**) and p < 0.01 using (*). The results suggest that TinPal not
only made users aware of all connection choices, but also influenced users to connect more dots in their pattern.
#Pattern length Count Percentage
4 1,624 0.42%
5 7,152 1.84%
6 26,016 6.68%
7 72,912 18.74%
8 140,704 36.16%
9 140,704 36.16%
#Patterns 389,112 100%
Table 7. Theoretical distribution of pattern length in 3 × 3 patterns.
Stroke Length. Not every line segment drawn on 3 × 3 grid has the same physical length. We measure the physical
length of a line segment using Euclidean distance. To do so, we label the upper-left dot in 3 × 3 grid as (0,0) and the
lower-right dot as (2,2). Thus, the Euclidean distance of the segment 1 → 2 is 1, that of 1 → 5 is √2, that of 1 → 3 is 2,
that of 1 → 6 is √5 and that of 1 → 9 is 2√2. The concept of stroke length captures the physical length of the pattern
and is defined as the sum of Euclidean distances of all line segments within the pattern [Aviv et al. 2015; Tupsamudre
et al. 2017]. Patterns containing the same number of dots can have different stroke lengths. For instance, the stroke
length of the pattern 12365 is 4, whereas the stroke length of the pattern 16729 is 4
√
5 ∼ 8.94. Stroke length is considered
as an important feature in resisting shoulder-surfing attacks [Sun et al. 2014] as well as guessing attacks [Aviv et al.
2015; Tupsamudre et al. 2017].
We found that the stroke length of patterns in the TinPal group (8.39) was significantly higher than any other group
(Table 6). Normalizing the stroke length with respect to the pattern length reveals the mean length of the line segment
used for creating patterns in all five groups. The normalized stroke length of patterns1 in the TinPal group was highest
8.39
7.04 ∼ 1.19. The normalized stroke length in the Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot group was 6.056.08 ∼ 0.99, 5.805.90 ∼ 0.98,
5.81
6.04 ∼ 0.96 and 5.505.92 ∼ 0.93 respectively. We found significant difference in the stroke length between the TinPal group
and all other groups (all p < 0.001, corrected two-tailed WMW test).
Frequency of Segments. Next, we analysed the usage frequencies of each of the 9 · 8 = 72 line segments across all
five groups. Figure 8 illustrates the frequencies of all possible such segments. The more popular the line segment, the
darker is the cell color. The number of unique line segments employed in the TinPal group was 59, whereas in the
Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups the numbers were 45, 44, 37 and 36 respectively. Therefore, participants in the
TinPal group used more diverse line segments than the rest of the groups. Further, the number of unique line segments
1We used the ratio of means since it is always less than or equal to the means of ratio by Jensens’ inequality.
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(a) Pattern length (b) Knight moves
(c) Overlaps (d) Direction changes
Fig. 7. Distribution of length, knight moves, overlaps and direction changes across five groups.
used decreased as the number of mandated points increased. Now, we report the usage of simple moves, knight moves
and overlaps in more detail.
• Simple Moves. A simple move occurs when a dot is connected to another dot that is one unit away in either
horizontal or vertical direction. In other words, line segments with the Euclidean distance of 1 or
√
2 are referred
to as simple moves. Figure 8 shows that the most frequently used line segments in the Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and
3-dots groups were simple moves of the form i → i+1 for all i = 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 and i → i+3 for all i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
each having unit length. Few examples of popular simple moves are 1 → 2, 7 → 8, 3 → 6 and 6 → 9 .The
distribution of simple moves in the TinPal group was relatively more uniform (less dark cells) as compared to
the other groups.
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Fig. 8. Usage of line segments (i → k ) across five groups. The more popular the line segment, the darker is the cell color.
• Knight Moves. The concept of knight move is similar to the one defined in the game of chess. A knight move
occurs when a dot is connected to another dot that is two units away in the horizontal (vertical) direction and one
unit away in the vertical (horizontal) direction. In other words, line segments with the Euclidean distance of
√
5
are referred to as knight moves. For instance, the segment 3 → 4 in the pattern 3457869 is a knight move (Figure
9a). The number of knight moves is considered to be an important feature in thwarting both shoulder-surfing
attacks [Zezschwitz et al. 2015] and guessing attacks [Andriotis et al. 2014]. Figure 8 shows that knight moves
were used rarely in the Original and SysPal groups. The distribution of knight moves across all five groups
is shown in Figure 7b. In the TinPal group, the number of patterns containing at least one knight move was
58%, whereas the numbers in the Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups were 22.45%, 18%, 14.29% and 18.75%
respectively.
• Overlaps. A line segment between two dots in a pattern is referred to as an overlap, if the dot between them is
already connected. In other words, the line segments with the Euclidean distance of either 2 or 2
√
2 are referred
to as overlaps. For instance, the line segment 9 → 1 in the pattern 5789123 constitutes an overlap (Figure
9b). Its length is 2
√
2. Another instance of an overlap is the connection 8 → 2 in the pattern 5821369 (Figure
9c). Its length is 2. The number of overlap moves is considered to be an important feature in resisting both
shoulder-surfing [Song et al. 2015; Sun et al. 2014; Zezschwitz et al. 2015] and guessing attacks [Andriotis et al.
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2014]. The distribution of overlaps across all five groups is shown in Figure 7c. In the TinPal group, the number
of patterns containing at least one overlap move was 40%, whereas the number of such patterns in the Original,
1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups were 12.24%, 16%, 9.16% and 4.17% respectively.
Therefore, TinPal interface influenced users to include more knight moves and overlaps in their pattern as compared to
SysPal policies.
(a) Pattern with knight move (b) With overlap move (c) With overlap move (d) With intersections
Fig. 9. Patterns with knight move, overlap move and intersections.
Direction Changes. Another important pattern characteristics that adds to the complexity of a pattern is direction
change. A direction change occurs when two consecutive line segments in a given pattern have different Euclidean
distances [Tupsamudre et al. 2017]. For instance, two consecutive line segments 3 → 4 and 4 → 5 in the pattern 3457869
constitute a direction change since these segments have different Euclidean distances (
√
5 and 1 respectively). Simple
patterns such as 321456987 (‘S’ shape) composed of unit distance line segments do not comprise any direction change
[Tupsamudre et al. 2017]. The theoretical distribution of direction changes is shown in Table 8. Theoretically, about 95%
of the patterns contain more than two direction changes. The distribution of direction changes across all five groups is
shown in Figure 7d. In the TinPal group, the number of patterns containing more than two direction changes was 52%,
while the number of such patterns in the Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups were 20.41%, 14%, 16.33% and 10.42%
respectively. The difference in the number of direction changes between the TinPal group and all other groups was
significant (all p < 0.001, corrected two-tailed WMW test).
#Direction Changes Count Percentage
0 664 0.17%
1 3,232 0.83%
2 15,800 4.06%
3 45,224 11.62%
4 89,096 22.90%
5 114,632 29.46%
6 89,640 23.04%
7 30,824 7.92%
#Patterns 389,112 100%
Table 8. Theoretical distribution of direction changes in 3 × 3 patterns.
Intersections. An intersection occurs when two non-consecutive line segments in a pattern cross each other. For
instance, the line segments 6 → 8 and 9 → 5 in the pattern 6895124 intersect each other (Figure 9d). Here, another
intersection occurs between the line segments 5 → 1 and 2 → 4. The number of intersections in a pattern is considered
as an important feature in countering shoulder-surfing attacks [Song et al. 2015; Sun et al. 2014; Zezschwitz et al.
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2015]. The theoretical distribution of intersections is shown in Table 9. After analysing the datasets, we found that the
highlighting mechanism had no significant effect on the number of intersections across all five groups (all p > 0.001,
corrected two-tailed WMW test). However, we found significant interest in the number of intersections between the
TinPal group and two SysPal groups, 2-dot and 3-dot (all p < 0.01, corrected two-tailed WMW test).
#Intersections Count Percentage
0 58,771 15.10%
1 85,536 21.98%
2 73,432 18.87%
3 61,775 15.88%
4 43,237 11.11%
5 26,462 6.80%
6 17,676 4.54%
7 10,484 2.69%
8 6,431 1.65%
9 2,829 0.73%
10 1,475 0.38%
11 533 0.14%
12 386 0.10%
13 49 0.01%
14 36 0.01%
#Patterns 389,112 100%
Table 9. Theoretical distribution of intersections in 3 × 3 patterns.
Frequency of Dots. Previous studies [Andriotis et al. 2014, 2013; Aviv et al. 2015; Tupsamudre et al. 2017; Uel-
lenbeck et al. 2013] demonstrate that majority of users start their pattern with the upper-left dot and end their pattern
with the lower-right dot. Unsurprisingly, we found that the upper-left dot was the most popular starting point (Figure
10) and the lower-right dot was the most popular ending point (Figure 11) in all five groups.
Figure 10 shows that the number of patterns starting with the upper-left dot was much less in the 1-dot group (just
20%) as compared to the other groups. This is because, 54% (27/50) of the participants in the 1-dot group started their
pattern with the system-assigned random dot. On the contrary, the number of patterns starting with the upper-left
dot in the 3-dot group was 39.58% (19/48) much higher than the other groups. This is because, in 89.47% (17/19) of
these cases, the upper-left dot was one of the three random dots assigned by the system. As a result, the entropy of the
starting point distribution in the 1-dot group was highest (3.04 bits) and the entropy in the 3-dot group was lowest (2.50
bits). However, we did not find any significant difference in the usage of the upper-left dot as starting point between
any pair of groups (p > 0.01, corrected two-tailed FET).
Figure 11 shows that the number of 3 × 3 patterns ending with the lower-right dot was highest in the 3-dot group,
31.25% (15/48). Further analysis revealed that in 22.92% (11/48) of the cases, the lower-right dot was one of the three
random dots assigned by the system. As a result, the entropy of the end point distribution in the 3-dot group was
just 2.67 bits, whereas in the other groups it was between 2.89 to 3.00 bits. However, we did not find any significant
difference in the usage of the lower-right dot as an ending point between any pair of groups (p > 0.01, corrected
two-tailed FET).
We also analysed the usage frequencies of each of the nine dots in 3 × 3 grid across all five groups (Figure 12).
The most frequently used dot in all SysPal groups was dot 5 (the center dot), whereas the most frequently used
dot in the TinPal and Original groups was dot 4. Overall, frequencies of all nine dots across five groups were evenly
distributed, and entropy in all five groups was nearly 3.16 bits. Note that maximum possible entropy is loд2(9) ∼ 3.17 bits.
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(a) Original (b) TinPal (c) 1-dot (d) 2-dot (e) 3-dot
Fig. 10. Distribution of starting points across five groups.
(a) Original (b) TinPal (c) 1-dot (d) 2-dot (e) 3-dot
Fig. 11. Distribution of ending points across five groups.
(a) Original (b) TinPal (c) 1-dot (d) 2-dot (e) 3-dot
Fig. 12. Distribution of all 9 dots across five groups.
Position of Mandated Dots. SysPal policies mandate users to include system-assigned random dot(s) in their 3 × 3
pattern. We found that across all SysPal policies there was a tendency to use system-assigned dots at the beginning of
the pattern. Specifically, 54% of the participants in the 1-dot group used the system-assigned dot in the first position of
their pattern, whereas 67.35% of the participants in the 2-dot group and 79.16% of the participants in the 3-dot group
used one of the system-assigned dots in the first position of their pattern. Similar behaviour was also reported in [Cho
et al. 2017].
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Next, we determined how often the system-assigned dots in the 2-dot and 3-dot patterns were used adjacent to each
other. We use the definition of adjacency as given in [Cho et al. 2017]. If there is a direct connection (line segment)
between two system-assigned dots then we consider those two dots to be adjacently located. For instance, if dot 1 and
dot 2 are system-assigned, and the pattern is 1236, we consider those two dots to be located adjacently. However, if
the pattern is 1452, then we do not consider dots 1 and 2 as located adjacently. There are
(9
2
)
= 36 possible ways of
selecting two dots (i, j) in 3 × 3 grid. Of these 36 pairs, 20 pairs (55.56%) can be connected directly using simple move, 8
pairs (22.22%) can be connected directly using knight move and the remaining 8 pairs (22.22%) can be connected using
overlap (Table 10).
Segment Type (i, j) Count
Simple (1,2), (1,4), (1,5) 20 (55.56%)
(2,3), (2,4), (2,5), (2,6)
(3,5), (3,6)
(4,5), (4,7), (4,8)
(5,6), (5,7), (5,8), (5,9)
(6,8), (6,9)
(7,8)
(8,9)
Knight (1,6), (1,8) 8 (22.22%)
(2,7), (2,9)
(3,4), (3,8)
(4,9)
(6,7)
Overlap (1,3), (1,7), (1,9) 8 (22.22%)
(2,8)
(3,7), (3,9)
(4,6)
(7,9)
Table 10. Classification of line segments between every two dots (i, j) in 3 × 3 grid.
In the 2-dot group, 53.06% (26/49) of the participants were assigned two random dots (i, j) which could be connected
directly using simple move, 24.49% (12/49) were assigned two dots which could be connected directly using knight move
and the remaining 22.45% (11/49) were assigned two dots which could be connected directly using overlap. We found
that 73.08% (19/26) of the participants in the first category placed system-assigned dots adjacently, i.e., they used simple
move. None of the participants (23/49) placed system-assigned dots adjacently in the other two categories, i.e., they did
not use knight move or overlap. In the 3-dot group, 77.08% (37/48) of the participants used at least two system-assigned
dots adjacently, whereas 27.08% (13/48) of the participants used all three system-assigned dots adjacently. Again, we
found that in 94.59% (35/37) of the cases where system-assigned dots were used adjacently, they were connected
using simple moves. Only in the remaining 5.41% (2/37) of the cases, knight moves were used. Therefore, whenever
system-assigned random dots were neighbours (Table 4), i.e., they belong to the same row (e.g., dots 1 and 2) or same
column (e.g., dots 1 and 4) or to the adjacent rows and columns (e.g., dots 1 and 5), they were more likely to be connected
with simple move.
5.2 Pattern Guessability
Markov Model.We use Markov model based attack technique to estimate the guessing resistance of patterns created
in all five groups. We closely follow the attack methodology as described in [Uellenbeck et al. 2013]. Markov models
exploit the fact that subsequent choices in a human-generated sequence are mostly dependent on previous choices. For
instance, in English language letter h is more likely to follow letter t than letter z. In case of 3 × 3 patterns, dot 2 is
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more likely to follow dot 1 than dot 6. Based on these observations, n-gram Markov model predicts the next choice in a
sequence using past n − 1 choices. The probability of a l length sequence s1s2 . . . sl can therefore be modelled as:
P(s1 . . . sl ) = P(s1 . . . sn−1) ·
l∏
i=n
P(si |si−n+1 . . . si−1) (2)
Our dataset. To build an n-gram Markov model, we need to decide the value of parameter n. If we choose the value of
n to be 2 (bigrams), then we require 9 · 8 = 72 data points, and if we choose the value of n to be 3 (trigrams), then we
require 9 · 8 · 7 = 504 data points. Since the control group dataset has 49 patterns and corresponding 298 data points that
are insufficient to learn trigram probabilities, we resort to bigrams. We use Laplace smoothing to account for unseen
bigrams.
We perform 10-fold cross-validation on each pattern set, i.e., we split patterns collected in each group into 10
approximately equal-sized subsets. One of the subset is used as a test set and the remaining 9 subsets are combined
into the training set. We use the training set to learn bigrams probabilities which in turn are used to estimate the
probabilities of all possible 389,112 patterns by equation (2). Subsequently, we sort all patterns in the decreasing order
of probability and simulate guessing attack on the test set. We perform this validation 10 times where every subset was
used in turn as a test set. We repeat this entire split-learn-simulate process 10 times and report the average results.
The guessability results are summarized in Table 11. The guessing algorithm could not crack any pattern (0%) in
the TinPal group, whereas it cracked 12%, 10%, 8% and 20% patterns in the Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups
respectively. These numbers suggest that patterns created on the TinPal interface were more resistant to guessing
attack than patterns created using any other group.
ASIACCS’17 dataset. We also had access to 69,797 3 × 3 patterns collected by Tupsamudre et al. [Tupsamudre
et al. 2017]. Since their dataset is huge, we learn trigram probabilities and use equation (2) to estimate the probabilities
of all possible patterns (389,112). We then sort all possible patterns and simulate guessing attack on our datasets. The
cracking results are given in Table 11.
Within first 20 attempts, the guessing algorithm cracked 4% of the patterns in TinPal group, whereas it cracked
12.24%, 8%, 6.12% and 18.75% of the patterns in the Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups respectively. Again, overall
patterns created using TinPal interface were more resistant to guessing attack than patterns created using the original
interface and all SysPal policies. Further, as reported in [Cho et al. 2017], patterns created on 1-dot and 2-dot interfaces
were more secure than the original interface whereas patterns created on the 3-dot interface were most vulnerable.
Thus, mandating too many dots could reduce the search space for the attacker.
Dataset Original TinPal 1-dot 2-dot 3-dot
Current 12% 0% 10% 8% 20%
ASIACCS’17 12.24% 4% 8% 6.12% 18.75%
Table 11. Guessability Results of all groups.
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6 USABILITY RESULTS
Now, we present the results pertaining to usability. Specifically, we compared memorability and efficiency of patterns
created on different interfaces.
Memorability.We measured memorability using the following two metrics:
• number of users who successfully recalled their pattern
• number of login attempts required to recall pattern
Before advancing to the pattern recall stage, participants in each group spent about 4 minutes to solve the distraction
task and answer questions related to demographics, their devices and screen locks. The results pertaining to pattern
recall are shown in Table 12. More than 96.00% of the participants in all five groups successfully recalled their pattern
within just three attempts. We found no significant difference in the login attempts between any pair of groups (all
p ∼ 1, corrected two-tailed FET) which suggests that patterns created using the TinPal interface were not only longer
and complex, but also easy to remember.
Original TinPal 1-dot 2-dot 3-dot
Attempt 1 35 (71.43%) 39 (78%) 39 (78%) 38 (77.55%) 36 (75%)
Attempt 2 11 (22.45%) 8 (16%) 7 (14%) 6 (12.24%) 8 (16.67%)
Attempt 3 2 (4.08%) 2 (4%) 2 (4%) 4 (8.16%) 3 (6.25%)
Successful 48 (97.96%) 49 (98%) 48 (96%) 48 (97.96%) 47 (97.92%)
Unsuccessful 1 (2.04%) 1 (2%) 2 (4%) 1 (2.04%) 1 (2.08%)
Total 49 50 50 49 48
Table 12. Login attempts of participants across five groups.
Efficiency. We measure efficiency using the following three metrics:
• time required to create pattern during creation stage
• time required to recall pattern during recall stage
Table 13 shows the median time required to create, redraw and recall pattern across five groups. Before advancing
to the pattern creation stage, participants in all groups tried multiple patterns in the training stage. This stage was
exploratory, and provided participants with an opportunity to become familiar with the assigned interface. The time
required to create a pattern in the TinPal group (median 3.91s) was maximum among all five groups (Table 13). However,
we note that the stroke length of patterns created in the TinPal group (median 8.27) was also higher than the other
groups (Table 6). Therefore, we normalize the pattern creation time i.e., for each participant, we divide the time required
to create the pattern with the stroke length of that pattern. The distribution of the normalized pattern creation time
across all five groups is depicted in Figure 13. After normalization, we found no find significant difference in the pattern
creation time between any pair of groups (all p > 0.001, corrected two-tailed WMW test). However, we found significant
interest in the normalized creation time between the TinPal group and other groups (p < 0.01, corrected two-tailed
WMW test)) which suggests that participants who used TinPal paid attention to the highlighted dots. All pairwise
p-values are depicted in Table 15 (Appendix A).
Similarly, the median time required to recall pattern in the TinPal group (2.11s) was relatively higher than the other
groups (Table 13). However, after normalizing the recall time with respect to the stroke length, the recall time of patterns
in the TinPal group (0.29s) was similar to the recall time of patterns in the other groups. We did not find any significant
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Median Original TinPal 1-dot 2-dot 3-dot
Creation time 1.64s 3.91s 1.67s 1.63s 1.34s
Normalized time 0.28s 0.43s 0.28s 0.31s 0.34s
Redraw time 1.27s 2.34s 1.56s 1.23s 1.16s
Normalized time 0.25s 0.29s 0.24s 0.28s 0.25s
Recall time 1.25s 2.11s 1.18s 1.37s 1.01s
Normalized time 0.23s 0.29s 0.25s 0.27s 0.25s
Table 13. Median time required to create, redraw and recall pattern across five groups.
difference or significant interest in the normalized recall time between the TinPal group and other groups (all p > 0.01,
corrected two-tailed WMW test). The pattern redraw time of all five groups after normalizing was also similar. The
distributions of the normalized redraw time and normalized recall time across all five groups are depicted in Figures 14
and 15 respectively.
Fig. 13. Comparison of normalized pattern creation time across all five groups.
Fig. 14. Comparison of normalized pattern redraw time across all five groups.
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Fig. 15. Comparison of normalized pattern recall time across all five groups.
Acceptability.We asked participants in the TinPal group an open-ended question: “Which pattern lock interface do you
prefer, the existing one that you have used before (on your phone) or the new one that you saw in our experiment"? Of the
29 (58%) experimental group participants who reported using Android pattern screen-lock before (Table 5), 27 (93.10%)
said that they would prefer the new one used in the experiment while 2 (6.90%) said that they would prefer the original
one. Remarks made by participants are as follows.
‘The new interface is better because of feedback feature.’
‘The new one gives more idea about the variety of patterns we can make.’
‘I prefer the existing interface, need simple patterns only.’
7 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we proposed a new 3 × 3 interface TinPal that informs users about different available connection options
during pattern creation as well as recall. We also gave an efficient algorithm to determine the set of reachable dots from
the currently connected dot in 3 × 3 grid. We evaluated the efficacy of TinPal and SysPal interfaces with a user study
involving 246 participants. The results of our comparative study indicate that TinPal influenced users’ pattern choices
without much affecting the usability. Participants who used TinPal created significantly longer patterns containing
visually complex features such as knight moves, overlaps and direction changes than those who used SysPal policies
or the original interface. Guessability results also show that patterns created on TinPal are more resilient to guessing
attacks than patterns created in any other group. These results are encouraging as TinPal just informed users about all
available options and did not force them to choose a particular option.
SysPal policies mandate users to use one, two or three randomly chosen dots in their pattern. However, our study
results show that these policies do not ensure that the resulting patterns will have important features such as knight
moves (e.g., 1 → 6) or overlaps (e.g., 1 → 3) as users may not be aware of such connection options. Therefore, a large
fraction of the search space remains unutilized. Comparatively, patterns drawn on TinPal used significantly longer
strokes and large number of knight moves, overlaps and direction changes. Further, we argue that it is possible for
users to circumvent SysPal policies by resetting the pattern until the desired dots are chosen by the system. TinPal, on
the other hand, does not force or persuade users to include any particular dot(s) in their pattern. It just informs them
about the next set of available options from the currently connected dot.
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Among three SysPal groups, we found that patterns created in the 2-dot group were more secure than those created
in the 1-dot and 3-dot groups. These findings are consistent with the previous study [Cho et al. 2017]. However, contrary
to the earlier findings [Cho et al. 2017], our study results show that patterns created using 3-dot policy were no better
than those created using the original interface. In fact, guessability results suggest that pattern created using the original
interface were more secure than those created using 3-dot policy (Table 11). Participants in the 3-dot policy tend to
create shorter patterns mostly using simple moves (Table 6). The number of unique line segments employed in the
Original group was 45 and in the 3-dot group the number was only 36. Similar was the case with the 2-dot group
where the number of unique line segments was just 37. TinPal patterns were created using 59 unique line segments, the
highest among all groups. Further, we found that whenever system-assigned dots were neighbours in 3 × 3 grid (Table
4) i.e., they belong to the same row or same column or to the adjacent rows and adjacent columns then users were most
likely to connect them directly with simple move. For example, if the system assigns two neighbouring dots 2 and 3 in
the first row, then the user is more likely to connect them directly than if the system assigns two dots 2 and 9 that
belong to different rows and columns. Note that, dots 2 and 9 could be connected directly using knight move but the
user may not be aware of such connection.
Our data indicates that TinPal had no effect on the starting point choices of the users, and they remain biased. For
example, the upper-left dot is still the most popular starting choice for creating 3 × 3 patterns. One way to reduce
this bias is to suggest a random starting point to the user as done in [Siadati et al. 2015]. After the user starts from
the suggested point, TinPal will spring into action and highlight the next set of reachable dots from the connected
dot. Unlike [Siadati et al. 2015], 1-dot SysPal policy allows users to place system-assigned dot at any position in their
pattern. However, our study results show that more than 50% of the users in the 1-dot group started their pattern with
the system-assigned random dot.
There is a possibility of combining TinPal and SysPal, however it would be more interesting to study the combined
effect of TinPal and different pattern strength meters proposed in the literature [Andriotis et al. 2014; Song et al. 2015;
Sun et al. 2014]. With the original interface, users might not be aware of all potential choices for creating their pattern
which can reduce the impact of pattern strength meters. The combination of TinPal and a pattern strength meter could
nudge users to create more secure patterns. As the user draws her pattern, TinPal will make her aware of all available
choices that could be reached from the current dot and at the same time the strength meter will indicate which of the
available choices are secure and which are not.
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Appendix A
Characteristic GroupA GroupB p-value significant
Pattern Length TinPal 1-dot 0.00096 **
TinPal 2-dot 0.00489 *
TinPal 3-dot 0.00057 **
TinPal Original 0.00687 *
1-dot 2-dot 0.73 no
1-dot 3-dot 0.63 no
1-dot Original 0.72 no
2-dot 3-dot 0.98 no
2-dot Original 0.97 no
3-dot Original 0.98 no
Stroke Length TinPal 1-dot 0.0000022 **
TinPal 2-dot 0.0000013 **
TinPal 3-dot 0.000000025 **
TinPal Original 0.0000074 **
1-dot 2-dot 0.90 no
1-dot 3-dot 0.96 no
1-dot Original 0.57 no
2-dot 3-dot 0.75 no
2-dot Original 0.76 no
3-dot Original 0.43 no
Direction Changes TinPal 1-dot 0.000006326 **
TinPal 2-dot 0.00005988 **
TinPal 3-dot 0.00001266 **
TinPal Original 0.00040858 **
1-dot 2-dot 0.57 no
1-dot 3-dot 0.73 no
1-dot Original 0.17 no
2-dot 3-dot 0.83 no
2-dot Original 0.41 no
3-dot Original 0.29 no
Intersections TinPal 1-dot 0.018432 no
TinPal 2-dot 0.003484 *
TinPal 3-dot 0.001697 *
TinPal Original 0.041358 no
1-dot 2-dot 0.59 no
1-dot 3-dot 0.45 no
1-dot Original 0.69 no
2-dot 3-dot 0.74 no
2-dot Original 0.43 no
3-dot Original 0.20 no
Table 14. Pairwise comparisons of pattern characteristics across five groups. ** indicates the difference between two groups is
statistically significant (p < 0.001), whereas * indicates there is significant interest (p < 0.01).
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Characteristic GroupA GroupB p-value significant
Creation Time TinPal 1-dot 0.003 *
TinPal 2-dot 0.008 *
TinPal 3-dot 0.004 *
TinPal Original 0.002 *
1-dot 2-dot 0.41 no
1-dot 3-dot 0.78 no
1-dot Original 0.74 no
2-dot 3-dot 0.67 no
2-dot Original 0.30 no
3-dot Original 0.58 no
Redraw Time TinPal 1-dot 0.13 no
TinPal 2-dot 0.85 no
TinPal 3-dot 0.06 no
TinPal Original 0.10 no
1-dot 2-dot 0.17 no
1-dot 3-dot 0.83 no
1-dot Original 0.77 no
2-dot 3-dot 0.09 no
2-dot Original 0.11 no
3-dot Original 0.93 no
Recall Time TinPal 1-dot 0.11 no
TinPal 2-dot 0.62 no
TinPal 3-dot 0.13 no
TinPal Original 0.04 no
1-dot 2-dot 0.10 no
1-dot 3-dot 0.96 no
1-dot Original 0.36 no
2-dot 3-dot 0.13 no
2-dot Original 0.02 no
3-dot Original 0.38 no
Table 15. Pairwise comparisons of normalized pattern creation time, redraw time and recall time across five groups. ** indicates the
difference between two groups is statistically significant (p < 0.001), whereas * indicates there is significant interest (p < 0.01).
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